# ISSUES IN DEVELOPING AND USING RISK TOLERANCE CRITERIA

by Paul Baybutt, Primatech Inc.

Presented at the

2013 AIChE Spring Meeting

9th Global Congress on Process Safety

San Antonio, Texas

April 28 – May 1, 2013


paulb@primatech.com

www.primatech.com



#### **OVERVIEW**

- Significance of risk tolerance criteria
- Development and use of risk tolerance criteria
- Issues



### SIGNIFICANCE OF RISK TOLERANCE CRITERIA

- Decisions on process safety must be made with reference to risk tolerance criteria
- Increasingly, risk analysis methods and codes, standards, and regulations around the world are moving towards the use of numerical criteria, e.g.
  - Use of Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
  - Standards for safety instrumented systems such as IEC 61511 / ISA 84

### DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF RISK TOLERANCE CRITERIA

- Appears to be a straightforward task
  - Deceptive
- Pitfalls await the unwary
- Paper addresses about 20 issues in developing and using criteria
  - Selected issues are covered in this presentation

### ISSUE - SOURCES OF RISK

- In process safety, the concern is with major hazards
  - Flammable, explosive, reactive and/or toxic hazards
- Facilities may pose risks to people from such other hazards as:
  - Working at height
  - Confined space entry
  - Asphyxiants
  - Corrosives
  - Hot gases and liquids

- Cryogenics
- Electricity
- Pinch points
- Vehicle accidents
- Etc.

### SOURCES OF RISK (CONTD.)


- Overall facility criteria are usually intended to address risks from all hazards at a facility
  - Should be offset to account for casualties from any sources excluded from a risk analysis



### EXAMPLE OF RISK OFFSET

- Individual annual fatality risk tolerance criterion for workers in a facility is set at 1 x 10<sup>-3</sup>
- Existing annual fatality rate from occupational accidents is 0.9 x 10<sup>-3</sup>
- Tolerable risk from process safety accidents is 1 x 10<sup>-4</sup>
  - Order of magnitude lower than the overall facility individual fatality criterion
    - Will have a major impact on risk reduction measures needed





### ISSUE - RISK FROM DIFFERENT CASUALTY TYPES

- Exclusive use of fatality risk criteria for people is not completely satisfactory
- Process safety incidents can and do produce injuries as well
  - Often much more numerous than fatalities



### IMPACTS OF CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS

Accident	Fatalities	Injuries	Ratio
Oppau, explosion, 1921	500 - 600	2,000	3 - 4
Feyzin, fire and explosion, 1966	18	81	5
Flixborough, vapor cloud explosion, 1974	28	36	1.3
Beek, explosion and fire, 1975	14	107	8
Mexico City, fire and explosions, 1984	500 - 600	5000–700 0	10 - 12
Bhopal, toxic vapor cloud, 1984	4,000- 20,000	550,000	28 - 138
Norco, explosion, 1988	7	42	6
Pasadena, vapor cloud explosion, 1989	23	314	14
Sterlington, explosion, 1991	8	120	15
Toulouse, explosion, 2001	29	2,500	86
Skikda, explosion, 2004	30	70	2
Texas City, fire and explosion, 2005	15	170	11

Prima**Tech** 

Note: Data are from multiple sources on the internet.

# RISK FROM DIFFERENT CASUALTY TYPES (CONTD.)

- Incorporate non-fatal health effects for people using the concept of equivalences
  - Allows a more inclusive definition of risk to be employed







# RISK FROM DIFFERENT CASUALTY TYPES (CONTD.)

- If average number of injuries that accompanies a single fatality is about 10
  - 10 injuries are equated with a fatality
    - Actual risk is doubled
- May not be of undue concern
  - Given uncertainties
- However, may be cases where the ratio of injuries to fatalities is much higher
  - Risk could be increased by an order of magnitude or more

### ISSUE - PEOPLE AT RISK

- Different communities and countries accept different levels of risk
- Many companies operate in numerous countries and communities
  - Same criteria could be used for all
  - Likely that local adjustments will be desirable or necessary





### PEOPLE AT RISK (CONTD.)

- Set criteria with reference to the risk levels from workplace and non-work-related accidents that are tolerated
- In the latter case with a reduction factor of as much as 1 percent
  - Account for the involuntary nature of the risk



#### ISSUE - ALLOCATION OF CRITERIA


- Risk analysis evaluates the risk of individual hazard scenarios and hazardous events
  - Contribute to the overall risk of a hazardous facility
- Practitioners often use risk tolerance criteria for hazard scenarios or hazardous events
  - ► In the belief that it is easier to calculate their risk rather than the overall risk of a facility
- Such criteria have no meaning by themselves

# ISSUE - ALLOCATION OF CRITERIA (CONTD.)

- Criteria must be derived by allocating or apportioning overall facility criteria to the scenarios or events
  - Facility criteria are divided by the estimated number of scenarios, events, etc
    - That can cause the casualty of one particular individual
- Estimating the number of events or scenarios is problematic
  - Guesstimates
  - No unique definitions



### INDIVIDUAL RISK



Values are per person per facility per year for all hazards.


#### PITFALLS IN ALLOCATING CRITERIA

- Individual criteria must be allocated not only to single but also multiple fatality scenarios
- Resulting criteria must be applied to all fatality scenarios
  - Regardless of the number of fatalities



### **GROUP RISK - F-N LIMIT LINE**





Number of Fatalities (N)

# PITFALLS IN ALLOCATING CRITERIA (CONTD.)

- Group criteria must be allocated in frequency space
  - Not cumulative frequency space in which group criteria are expressed







### ISSUE - ENTITY TO WHICH CRITERIA APPLY

- Facilities may contain multiple processes and units
- Risks can be evaluated for entities such as:
  - Processes
  - Units
  - Process modes and phases







- Facility personnel, and people living near a facility, will be concerned about the total risk to which they are exposed
  - From all hazards within the facility
    - Also, from different processes, units, and modes
  - Not just from one hazard scenario or hazardous event

- Companies will be concerned about:
  - Risk to all employees and members of the public
    - From all hazards within the facility
  - Risk to individuals



- Cumulative risk estimates are needed for comparison with overall facility risk tolerance criteria
  - Type of criteria used by regulators
  - Only total facility risk has real meaning
- Must aggregate risk over all hazard types, processes, process units and process modes for the facility

- Reliance solely on meeting overall risk tolerance criteria may result in the inequitable distribution of risk across a facility
- May be processes, areas, units, process modes, etc. that bear the brunt of the risk
  - Resulting from the disproportionate allocation of risk across the facility



- Overall risk determination should be accompanied by the allocation of the overall risk tolerance across a facility
  - Particularly to receptors as ultimately that is what matters



**PrimaTech** 



### ISSUE - MATCHING CALCULATED RISK WITH CRITERIA

- Type and form of risk estimates must be the same as those of the risk criteria used, e.g.
  - Type of individual risk
  - ► Form of expression of group risk
- Entity to which they apply must be defined
  - E.g. scenario, event, process, facility



### PITFALLS IN MATCHING CALCULATED RISK WITH CRITERIA

- Overall facility criteria are incorrectly applied to individual scenarios or events
  - Underestimates risk
- Individual risk criteria are used but group risk is calculated
  - ▶ Leads to unnecessary risk reduction measures
- Group risks are calculated in f-N space but are compared with tolerable criteria from F-N space
  - Underestimates risk

#### ISSUE - UNCERTAINTIES IN RISK ESTIMATES

- Factors influencing the situation are known but their effects cannot be described precisely
  - Modeling
  - Data
- Significant for high-consequence, lowfrequency events
  - Particularly important when risk estimates are close to risk tolerance criteria

# UNCERTAINTIES IN RISK ESTIMATES (CONTD.)

- Often addressed by making conservative assumptions throughout the analysis
  - Produces unknown conservatism in the results
- Preferred treatment is to conduct uncertainty analysis
- Calculate risk distribution
  - Use high percentiles for comparison with risk tolerance criteria





#### SIGNIFICANCE OF UNCERTAINTIES

- Consequence severities
  - Calculated: within a factor of 2
  - Estimated qualitatively: within a factor of 5
- Frequencies
  - Calculated: within a factor of 10
  - Estimated qualitatively: within a factor of 50
- Risk
  - Modeling uncertainties
  - Factor of 10





# SIGNIFICANCE OF UNCERTAINTIES (CONTD.)

- Overall uncertainty factor of at least 200
- Typical range between intolerable and broadly acceptable risk tolerance values is 1,000
  - Uncertainties are a major issue



#### CONCLUSIONS

- Development and use of risk tolerance criteria should be approached with care
  - Numerous pitfalls must be avoided
- Risk tolerance criteria help to determine the extent of harm that is viewed as tolerable
  - ▶ Influence:
    - Allocation of resources
    - Technologies used in facilities